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C~nlral ,Am~nra alld Ih~ Caribb~all
A11.ANTIC OCEAN
-Bcrmud..l(U.K..)
created animosity with a communist regime
one hundred miles from our shores. The
debates not withstanding, the fact remains
that Fidel Castro developed a Soviet
satellite in our traditional sphere of influence
and thereby singlehandedly transformed
the geopolitical forces in the Central
American-Caribbean region. For the first
time a revolution with definite anti-
American overtones led by an avowed
communist succeeded in our "backyard."
Not surprisingly, the history of U.S.-
Cuban relations since 1959 has been
marked by a series of attempts to topple the
Castro government and reassert our
complete domination in the hemisphere.
Almost immediately upon Castro's
revolutionary victory, the United States
responded with sugar embargoes,
diplomatic slights and harsh words. Later on
the American public would find out about
our clandestine efforts to "destabilize" the
Castro regime through assassination,
sabotage and the infamous Bay of Pigs
invasion.
But despite these efforts, Castro held on
and in some respects even flourished. With
considerable Soviet aid (now estimated at
over three billion dollars a year), a
supportive population and some wise social
programs aimed at eradicating disease and
illiteracy, Castro managed to hold up to the
world an alternative to United States
capitalism and liberal democracy. Within a
matter of a few years, the United States and
the American way were being challenged by
an upstart revolutionary. What is perhaps
even more significant is that Castro's
triumph was well received throughout Latin
UNITED STATES
Castro's Geopolitical Revolution
The Breakup 0/ the
Central American-Caribbean
Sphere 0/ Influence
Presidents, starting with Theodore
Roosevelt, have felt an obligation to
intervene whenever economic and political
circumstances in this region warranted
action. Not surprisingly, American
corporations targeted the area as ripe for
investment and profit making; tourists
streamed down to the beacr1€s and casinos
thinking of these countries as mere
extensions of American soil; and military
and diplomatic strategists felt little
hesitation in recommending the sending of
troops or civilian advisors to secure the
peace or straighten out the finances of our
neighbors in a manner reminiscent of a
landlord taking care of his property.
For a good portion of the twentieth
century the United States maintained
without significant challenge its hold on the
Central American-Caribbean sphere of
influence. But a series of events starting with
the Cuban revolution in 1959 weakened our
hold on the region, and helped contribute to
the unrest in places like EI Salvador and
Nicaragua.
Cuba's revolution of 1959 and its
subsequent drift into Marxism has been the
topic of endless analysis. Debates still rage
over whether the United States should have
acted more forcefully to bring the Castro
regime down or whether we needlessly
T he revolution in Central America has
not only helped most Americans learn
where EI Salvador and Nicaragua are
situated on the map, but, more importantly,
it has placed before them two opposing
interpretations of what is actually going on
in that part of the world. By the Reagan
Administration, the American public is told
that the fighting in this region is a result of
communist expansionism. The Salvadoran
rebels, in concert with the Nicaraguans and
the Cubans, are seeking to spread their
influence and establish Marxist satellite
states. Those who disagree with the Reagan
position claim that the outbreak of
revolution stems from social and economic
inequality. After decades of elite rule
maintained through corrupt, repressive and
unlawful means, peasants and the urban
poor are taking up weapons to bring an end
to the injustice.
Although these two approaches to the
conflict in Central America both evolve
from defensible positions, the American
public should be aware that the turmoil in
this region can be examined from a third
perspective. The revolutions in Nicaragua
and EI Salvador have also occurred because
United States influence is declining in this
strategic area; and as a result, our ability to
contain the fighting and direct the future
development of these countries is
diminishing.
Since the turn of the century, the nation-
states that rim the Caribbean have become
part of our sphere of influence. The
direction and development of these nations
has been closely linked to, if not controlled,
by decisions made in Washington.
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1965 to put down an urban civil war. Since
the Johnson Administration was able to
stop the fighting and diminish the influence
of the leftist rebels in the new government
that was formed, Washington was pleased
with the "no second Cuba" policy. It seemed
that we could stop rev'olution and regain our
control over this region through swift
military intervention. Castro would perhaps
be just an aberration.
But the Vietnam War followed, and we
learned to our dismay that not all
interventions end in success. We also lost a
good deal of our enthusiasm for interfering
in the internal matters of another country,
no matter how threatened an ally was by
communist aggression. The memory of
domestic opposition to the war and the
costs, human and monetary, of fighting a
guerrilla war made Presidents Gerald Ford
and Jimmy Carter reluctant to play
policemen to the world.
Even though the Vietnam War ended, the
revolutionary aspirations of people in the
less-developed countries remained active.
This time the revolution was in Nicaragua,
where a guerilla army called the Sandinistas
was pitted against the repressive, but pro-
U.S. Government of Anastosio Somoza.
When the Sandinista rebels showed
remarkable ability to sustain their war
and later achieve significant victories over
U.S. trained government troops, our
country was once again thrust into a
dilemma over the proper response to a
leftist challenge in our sphere of influence.
The United States could exert its economic,





One of the major policy positions taken
by the United States Government after the
Cuban revolution was that this country
would never permit "another Cuba."
Presumably a "second Cuba" would begin
the process of falling dominoes in Latin
America and create a threat to our national
security.
Under President Lyndon Johnson the
United States exercised its power to
prevent a "second Cuba" when it sent
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The OPEC oil price escalation also had an
emotional impact on United States relations
in its sphere of influence and served to
further lessen our ability to dominate the
economics of this region. Facing enormous
debts as a result of payments for oil, the
countries of Central America and the
Caribbean sought greater access to United
States markets and more advantageous
terms of trade. The response from the
United States, which also had severe
balance of payments problems, was either
to deny access or to pass protective
legislation that increased trade barriers.
The reaction to these steps by the United
States was unusually hostile and was
expressed in terms that signaled a new
found independence and a determination on
the part of these countries never to permit
their future to depend on American
goodwill. As a result, the leaders of many
Central American and Caribbean nations
became more aggressive in their trade talks
with the United States and intensified their
efforts to open up their economies to new
sources of trade, aid and investment. The
days of one-sided, paternalistic commercial
and financial relations with the United
States were over.
The Big Stick in the Caribbean Sea
Even though the United States remained
the primary trade, aid and investment
partner with the countries of Central
America and the Caribbean, the influx of
foreign competition cut into its trade
percentages and provided these countries
OPEC and the
Rise of Competition
While Castro successfully defied the
political superiority of the United States in
its sphere of influence, the changing world
economy lessened American business and
financial dominance in this region. With the
onset of the world recession in the 1970s
and the rise in influence of the OPEC oil
cartel, the United States began to recognize
that it faced stiff competition from a number
of countries that previously had been
inactive in Central America and the
Caribbean. Countries like Japan, West
Germany, Taiwan, South Korea, Spain and
Canada along with some of the emerging
Latin American economies like Brazil and
Mexico challenged the long standing United
States domination of trade and investment
in the region.
America. After years of United States
control and domination, the Latins finally
could look to someone who was successful
in breaking the American hold on this
region.
As the Cuban revolution enjoys its 25th
anniversary, the excitement and aura that it 1
once created has disappeared. There is
much to criticize about the industrial and
agricultural failures, the political prisoners
and the dependence on the Soviet Union.
The development problems inside Cuba,
however, do not diminish the fact that
Castro's revolution not only changed life in
that country, but also radically altered the
face of hemispheric power relations.
Castro's revolution served notice that
America was no longer unchallenged in the
geographic region closest to its border.
Somoza in office and thereby retain the viability of the "no second
Cuba" doctrine, or it could refuse to become entangled in the
internal guerrilla war to uphold the government of one of Latin
America's most repressive and corrupt dictators.
In an earlier era the choice would have been an easy one, as the
United States sent out its fleet and a contingent of Marines. But in
the late 1970s, on the heels of our Vietnam debacle, the Carter
Administration revealed the internal conflicts that come with the
knowledge that time and circumstances have changed the way the
U. S. views itself and its sphere of influence. A combination of
public hostility to Somoza, Congressional opposition to further
intervention, criticism from Latin American nations, and a
President who was reluctant to exercise American might created a
policy marked by apprehension, vacillation, contradiction and
half-hearted support for both sides. Even though the Nicaraguan
revolution was following a course somewhat similar to the Cuban
revolution, the Carter Administration was both unable and
unwilling to take steps that would firmly reestablish our control of
this vital country.
By refusing to intervene to stop the Sandinistas, the United
States not only negated its "no second Cuba" pledge, but more
importantly it acknowledged that the circumstances once
conducive to an aggressive maintenance of our sphere of influence
had changed dramatically. To some, this was an example of what
came to be called the "Vietnam syndrome," but to others it was
rather another sign that we could no longer control the destiny of
neighboring countries as we had in the past. Whatever the reason,
the revolution in Nicaragua further adjusted the geopolitics of the
region and set the stage for EI Salvador and a new U. S. President
who approached our status in Central America and the Caribbean
in a far different manner.
Ronald Reagan and the
Attempt at Regaining Our Sphere of Influence
When Ronald Reagan came into office in January of 1981, he
made it clear that his Administration would seek to reestablish a
respected United States presence in the Central American-
Caribbean region. Using his strongly anti-communist beliefs as a
springboard for action, Reagan sought to meet head on what he
felt was Marxist revolution at our doorstep. Unlike Jimmy Carter
who abhorred Somoza's human rights violations, Ronald Reagan
emphasized combating communism and protecting our southern
border from revolution.
To achieve his aim, Reagan reminded the American people that
Central America was within our sphere of influence and therefore
had to be protected from internal instability and external
expansionism. The President renamed this region the Caribbean
Basin to help accent its importance and proximity to the United
States and reintroduced the domino theory to suggest that failure
to shore up pro-U.S. governments in this region could eventually
lead to a series of crumbling governments, ending with Mexico.
The message came through clearly u the United States must
reassert its ability to control the future of this region, because the
decline of our influence has created a significant threat to the
nation's security.
The means to achieve this reassertion of American power were
presented in the form of a two-pronged program that linked capital
formation with containment. In 1981, the Administration unveiled
its Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which sought to use free trade
agreements and healthy doses of foreign aid as a means of drawing
the countries of the region closer to the United States, while also
encouraging American businesses through favorable tax
incentives to regain our competitive advantage. The foreign aid
component of the CBI -- $350 million u was passed by Congress in
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Instances of use of
Central America and the
11101 - Colombia (Slata of Panama) - Novambar 20 - December 4
To protect American property on the Isthmus and to keep transit lines
open dUring serious revolutionary disturbances.
1102 - Colombia (Slate of Panama) - Seplember 17 - November 18
To place armed guards on all trains crossing ttle Isthmus and to keep tne
railroad line open.
11103 • Honduras - March 231030 or 31
To protect the American consulate and the steamship wnarf at Puerto
Cortez during a period of revolutionary activity.
1103·14 - Panama
To protect American interests and lives during and following the
revolut1on for independence from Colombia over construction of the
Isthmian Canal. With brief intermissions, United States Marines were
stationed o~ the Isthmus from November 4, 1903 to January 21, 1914, to
guard Amencan interests.
11104 • Dominican Republic - January 2 10 February 17
To protect American interests in Puerto Plata and Sosua and Santo
Domingo City during revolutonary fighting.
1804 • Panama· November 1710 24
To protect American lives and property at Aneon at the time of a
threatened insurrection.
1l108-08 - Cuba - September 190610 January 1909
Intervention to restore order, protect foreigners. and establiSh a stable
government after serious revolutionary activity.
1107 - Honduras - March 1810 June 8
To protect American interests during a war between Honduras and
Nicaragua: troops were stationed for a few days or weeks in Trujillo.
Celba. Puerto Cortez. San Pedro. Laguna and Choloma.
1810 • Nicaragua· February 22
During a civil war, to get information of conditions at Corinto: May 19 to
September 4, to protect American interests at Bluefields.
1811 • Honduras· January 26 and some weeks thereafter
To protect American lives and interests during a civil war in Honduras.
1812 • Panama
Troops. on request of both political parties, supervised elections outside
the Canal Zone.
1812 - Cuba· June 5 to August 5
To protect American interests on the Province of Ortente, and in Havana.
1812·25 • Nicaragua· August to November 1912
To protect American interests during an attempted revolution. A small
force serving as a legation guard and 8S 8 promoter of peace and govern·
mentai stability. remained until August 5, 1925.
1813 • Mexico· September 5 to 7
A few marines landed at Cloris Estero to Bid in evacuating American
citizens and others from the Yaqui Valley, made dangerous for foreigners
by civil strife. .
1814 - Haili - January 29 to February 9. February 20 to 21, October 19
To protect American nationals in a time of dangerous unrest
1914 - Dominican Republic - June and July.
During 8 revolutionary movement. United States naval forces by gunfire
stopped the bombardment of Puerto Plata, and by threat of force
maintained Santo Domingo City as a neutral zone.
1814-17 - Me.ico
The undeclared Mexican-American hostilities follOWing the Dolphin
affair and Villa's raids included capture of Vera Cruz and later PerShing's
expedition into northern Mexico.
1915-34 - Haiti - July 28. 1915 to AU9ust 15. 1934
To maintain order during a period of Chronic and tnreatened InsurrectIon
1916-24 - Dominican Republic - May 1916 to September 1924
to maintain order during a penod of ChrOniC tnreatened InsurrectIOn.
1982, but it was not until August, 1983 that the trade and tax
sections of the bill were voted out, only to have the Congress limit
the tax incentives to conventions and cruise ship deductions and
place a number of protective stipulations on the entry of certain
goods into the United States. Despite the delay and the
restrictions, the CBI remains a key part of the Reagan policy to
expand our influence in the Caribbean Basin.
While the CBI was working its way through the Congress, the
Reagan Administration was embarking on its most controversial
policy initiative n containment of further communist expansion in
our sphere of influence. The policy of containment was used by
this country in Europe after World War II as a means of preventing
the further advance of Soviet communism. In the Reagan view,
containment could once again be employed as a way of preventing
the spread of revolutionary activity in Central America. To
implement the policy of containment, the Reagan Administration
began pumping millions of dollars of economic and military
u.s. Armed Forces in
Caribbean - 1901-1983
1917-22 - Cuba
To protect Amencan Interests dUring an Insurrection and subsequent
unsellied conditions. Most of Ihe U. s. armed forces lett Cuba by August
1919, but two companies remained at Camaguey until February 1922.
1111-11 - Mexico
After withdrawal of Ine PerShing expedition, our troops entered Mexico in
pursuit of bandIts at least three times in 1918 and six in 1919. In August
1918 American and Mexican troops fought at Nogales.
1111-20 - Panama
For police duty according to treaty stipulations, at Chirique, during
election dIsturbances and sebs8quent unrest.
1111 - Honduras - September 8 to 12
A landing force was sent ashore to maintain order in a neutral zone during
an attempted revolution.
1120 - Guatemala - Apfll 9 to 27
To protect the Amencan Legation and other American Interests, such
as the cable station. during a period of fl9htlng between Unionists and the
Government of Guatemala.
1921 - Panama-Costa R,ca
American naval squadrons demonstrated In April on both Sides of the
Isthmus to prevent war between the two countries over a boundary
dispute.
1124 - February 28 to March 31. September 10 to 15
To protect American lives and interests during election hostilities.
1125 - Honduras - Apfll 29 to 21
To protect foreigners at La Celba during a political upheaval.
1125 - Panama - October 12 to 23
Strikes and rent riots led to the landing of about SIX hundred American
troops to keep order and protect Amencan interests.
1126-33 • Nlcara9ua· May 7 to June 5. 1926: AU9usr 27. 1926 to January 3. 1933
Tne coup d'etat of General Cnamorro aroused reVOlUtionary activities
leading to tne landing of Amencan mannes to protect tne Interests of tne
U.S United States forces came and went. but seem not to nave lett tne
country entirely until January 3. 1933. Tnelr work Included activity
against tne outlaw leader Sandlno In 1928.
1133 - Cuba
DUring a revolution ag8lnst PreSident Gerardo MaChado naval forces
demonstrated but no landing was made.
1151·80 • The Caflbbean
2d Marine Ground Task Force was deployed to protect U S. nationals
dU(lng the Cuban cnSls
1182 - Cuba
PreSident Kennedy instituted a "quarrantlne" on the Shipment of offenSive
miSSiles to Cuba from the Soviet Union He also warned the Soviet Union
tnat Ine launching of any missile from Cuba against any nation In the
Western Hemisphere would bnng about U S nuclear retaliation on the
Soviet Union A negotiated settlement was achieved In a few days.
1965 • Domlmcan RepublIC
Intervention to protect lives and property dUring a Dominican revolt More
troops were sent as tne U S. feared the revolutionary torces were coming
increasingly under Communist control
1980 to Pr•••nt . EI Salvador
United States military adVisors sent to Instruct government troops In antl-
guernlla tactics
1982 to Present· Honduras
United States MIlitary advisors sent to tram government troops.
1913 - Greneda
United States military forces invade Grenada
Adapted from US. library of Congo Foretgri AffaIrs ON. Committee
Print, 94th Congo lst seSS. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print Off. 1975, p. 58·66.
assistance to pro-U.S. countries. in the region; more civilian and
military advisors were sent to train the armies of El Salvador and
Honduras; sophisticated radar and tracking equipment was used
to pinpoint the transfer of weapons from Cuba and Nicaragua to
the rebels; and an occasional resort to old-fashioned gunboat
diplomacy served to remind the rebels and their supporters that
the United States was serious about stopping the spread of
communist influence in the area.
The epitome of Reagan's containment policy can be seen in the
October, 1983 invasion of the tiny island of Grenada. With the
assassination of Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop (who
was beginning to moderate his socialist revolution and move
closer to the United States) by doctrinaire Marxists with ties to
Cuba and the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration wasted
little time in sending the troops to restore a pro-United States gov-
ernment. Although eighteen U. S. soldiers were lost and scores
wounded, the Grenadian invasion was judged a stunning success.
But despite the strong popular support for the Grenada
invasion in the United States, President Reagan has become more
aware that in places like El Salvador and Nicaragua regaining the
initiative from the Marxists may not be as quick and easy as on a
Caribbean island with 100,000 citizens and a militia of a few
thousand. Already public opinion has shown disfavor with
Reagan's Central American policy. Many in Congress are
bothered by the overt signs of war and the co~ertmachinations of
the CIA, and our neighbors in Latin America are fearful that U. S.
involvement in the Salvadoran revolution may expand the fighting
to all of Central America. To those with vivid memories of the
Vietnam War era, the answer is not containment but negotiation
with the rebels, and with their supporters in Nicaragua and Cuba.
For its part, the Reagan Administration seems cautious about
entering into negotiations with the rebels and their supporters and
more interested in winning a victory. Although the Administration
is reluctant to state it publicly, a victory in El Salvador means more
than just a defeat of the insurgents; it also would serve as a clear
sign of United States resurgence in Central America and our
willingness to follow a course of action that combats the spread of
a foreign ideology in our traditional sphere of influence. It is this
concern with reestablishing our preeminence in Central America
that has made winning in El Salvador of critical importance. El
Salvador has become more than just a communist-inspired
guerilla war; it is now a test of our ability to maintain control in a
region that we view as vital to our national interest.
Limits on Reagan Policy
in Central America
Although President Reagan is following a path designed to
strengthen our position in Central America, it is important to point
out that the attainment of his objective may be complicated by new
forces at work in the region and at home_ One of the most recent
developments in the Central American crisis is that the United
States faces a more unified and vocal Latin American community
of nations. Whereas in the past the United States "handled" an
uprising or a debt collection fracas by itself and cared little for the
views of its neighbors, today the United States cannot ignore the
fact that there are other influential actors in this revolutionary
drama. Countries like Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama
that form what is termed the Contadora group are unwilling to
take a backseat in this crisis_ They have lobbied hard to force a
negotiated settl€ment and have shown the Reagan Administration
that they can serve as effective intermediaries with the rebels.
Moreover, these countries have stated categorically that they will
not tolerate a land war in this region, especially one that involves
United States troops. It is this unity of purpose and forceful
presentation of concerns that has reminded the President that to
act in Central America without recognizing the impact on the
region would be foolhardy and counterproductive.
What is potentially more complicating and serious than the new
found influence of the Latin American nations is that the Central
American crisis has begun to be viewed in terms of an East-West
confrontation. Even though Khrushchev took his missiles out of
Cuba in 1962, Russian designs on the Caribbean Basin have not
diminished. In fact, recent analysis confirms that Central America
and the Caribbean have seen a marked increase in the Soviet
presence in the last ten years. Soviet trade representatives, arms
merchants, cultural exchanges, KGB agents, navy flotillas, fishing
fleets and diplomats can be found throughout the region.
The Soviet presence may indeed serve to support President
Reagan's claims of communist expanionism at our doorstep, but it
also complicates a solution to the crisis and heightens the danger
of a superpower showdown. What was a relatively small and
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localized conflict could evolve into regional
competition between the United States and
the Soviet Union for control of the
Caribbean Basin. With Cuba supplying
Soviet arms to the Salvadoran rebels,
Russian Mig-21's rumored to be heading for
Nicaragua and a Soviet base near
completion in Grenada before U.S. troops
arrived, the Reagan Administration has
enough examples of Soviet designs on this
region to justify our involvement.
Unfortunately this competition can develop
a life of its own and build to proportions
where the war in El Salvador becomes
secondary to the confrontation between the
two superpowers.
The key to avoiding a U.S.-Soviet
confrontation in Central America is Cuba.
Since taking office, the Reagan
Administration has spoken harshly toward
the regime of Fidel Castro and has been
unwilling to normalize relations with
Havana. The Grenada invasion where U.S.
troops killed twenty-four Cubans and cap-
tured hundreds of others has done nothing
to bring these two enemies together. In fact,
the inclination of the Reagan Administration
at present seems to be to meet the Cuban
expansionist efforts head on even though
there are dangers in such a policy. It is
important for the President to remember
that such a policy position could easily spur
the Russians to become directly involved in
the Caribbean Basin in order to insure that
Castro and his revolutionary allies will not
be intimidated by the United States.
Finally, when one speaks of the complex
nature of public policy formation and
implementation in Central America, the
impact of domestic politics cannot be
ignored. A great deal has changed in the
United States since Theodore Roosevelt
"took" the Panama Canal or Woodrow
Wilson sent General Pershing across the
Mexican border to capture Pancho Villa.
Today, foreign policy development is
conducted in an atmosphere of
Congressional oversight, extensive media
coverage, interest group pressure and
forceful public opinion.
Much has been made by President
Reagan of our unwillingness since Vietnam
to utilize this country's strength to achieve
foreign policy objectives. But this so-called
unwillingness on the part of past presidehts
stems not so much from a Vietnam backlash
as from a recognition that it is now more
difficult to initiate and carry through to
completion a specific foreign policy,
especially one which calls for some form of
military involvement. Today, a president
who seeks to take aggressive action in order
to combat communism or maintain our
influence must contend with legal restraints,
popular demonstrations, partisan politics
and a sceptical citizenry. The roadblocks to
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successful foreign policy-making are so
numerous that national leaders must be
extremely strong-willed or courageous to
propose and carry out a particular course of
action.
Already, President Reagan's efforts to
regain influence in Central America point up
the limits of foreign policy-making in our
democracy. The spending of additional
millions of dollars on the CIA's covert war in
Honduras has met with a hostile reception
from Congress, the ravages of w~r in
Central America are captured on film and
compete with the President as he seeks
support for further involvement, and a host
of human rights organizations place
unrelenting pressure on the White House to
curtail its support of rightist military officers,
even though these· officers are firm
adherents to the objectives of the Reagan
Administration.
So far, Mr. Reagan has met his critics
head on and taken this country further into
the Central American revolution. But what
the President must remember (as Lyndon
Johnson and Richard Nixon found out to
their dismay) is that there is a point beyond
which a president's will and communicative
skills cannot easily overcome the labyrinth
of opposition to a particular foreign policy
decision. In modern day American politics,
foreign policy formation and implementa-
tion must derive from consensus rather
than from the determination of the White
House. If Mr. Reagan is to succeed in
reestablishing United States preeminence in
the Caribbean Basin, he will have to do so by
convincing the numerous constituencies in
this country that it is in our national interest
to engage in activities that bring us
perilously close to a Vietnam-like
commitment.
A Look At The Future 0/
Our Sphere 0/ Influence
Americans do not admit defeat easily nor
accept the view that our power in the world
arena is declining. And yet, it is essential for
every major nation to periodically assess its
standing in the world or in a particular
region of that world and make some
judgements on the proper course to follow.
There is no question that our position in
the Central American-Caribbean sphere of
influence has changed since the early 1960s.
We should not be surprised by the
competition, the revolution, the
nationalism, and our inability to control our
neighbors for our own interests. After
nearly a century of dominance, a decline in
influence was inevitable.
But what is surprising is the vigor that the
current Administration brings to its attempt
at regaining our position in this sphere. The
Reagan Administration is clearly on a
mission to insure that friendly governments
remain in power in Central America and
that hostile movements are unable to
spread their influence. President Reagan
firmly believes in the domino theory and the
possibility that our southern border could
be jeopardized by left-wing revolution
traveling northward from El Salvador. The
dollars, the guns, the advisors, the aircraft
carriers, and the tough talk stem from a real
fear that we are on the defensive in our
sphere of influence and may not be doing
enough to regain the initiative. Grenada
may be the first step in a long process of
regaining complete control of our sphere of
influence.
The Reagan analysis of our decline in the
Caribbean Basin may be exaggerated, since
many Administration critics do not see a
revolution in Mexico, or a United States en-
circled by the communists. And yet, this
American President has embarked on a
mission to establish our power position as it
was prior to 1959. As to the success of the
Reagan mission, only time will tell. The
President's actions may strengthen our hold
on the Caribbean Basin or they may alienate
our neighbors and encourage the
revolutionary left to dig in deeper. The only
certainty about the Reagan mission is that it
comes at a time when the forces of change
can be found everywhere. Not only has our
sphere of influence changed, but so have the
internal political conditions in the United
States necessary to assure a successful
mission. The future of United States policy
in its sphere of influence thus depends on
how well we adjust to the new geopolitics of
the region and on whether we are able to
muster the same vigor as our President as
he sets out on this mission.
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